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Abstract
Learning by observing and imitating others, has long been recognized as constituting a 
powerful learning strategy for humans. Recent findings from neuroscience research, more 
specifically, on the mirror-neuron system, begin to provide insight into the neural bases of 
learning by observation and imitation. These findings are discussed here, along with their 
potential consequences for the design of instruction, focusing in particular on the 
effectiveness of dynamic vs. static visualizations.
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The Mirror-Neuron System and Observational Learning: Implications for the Effectiveness of 
Dynamic Visualizations
Observational learning is considered one of the most basic and powerful mechanisms 
by which people learn (Bandura, 1986). Indeed, we may have evolved to observe and imitate 
other people (see Sweller & Sweller, 2006). Cognitive load theory (CLT) argues that because 
of the way human cognitive architecture is organized, learning by observing and/or imitating1 
what other people do, say, or write, is a much more effective and efficient way of acquiring 
knowledge than trying to devise this knowledge by ourselves (Paas, Renkl, & Sweller, 2003, 
2004; Sweller, 1988, 2004; Sweller & Sweller, 2006; Sweller, Van Merriënboer, & Paas, 
1998; Van Merriënboer & Sweller, 2005). 
Many educational programs advocate that problem-solving skills are acquired best by 
having learners solve many problems. Indeed, when faced with new problems for which there 
are no known solutions or models available, there is no alternative to problem solving. 
However, as argued by CLT, in all other cases observational learning is much more effective 
and efficient, and should be implemented where possible. A large body of empirical research 
has confirmed that learning from “expert”2 models, either by observing them solving 
problems “live” or on video (i.e., modeling examples), or by studying a written account of 
their problem-solving process (i.e., worked examples), is very effective for acquiring both 
motor and cognitive skills, and is more effective for novice learners than learning by solving 
the equivalent problems (e.g., Braaksma, Rijlaarsdam, Van den Bergh, & Van Hout-Wolters, 
2004; Cooper & Sweller, 1987; Kitsantas, Zimmermann, & Cleary, 2000; Paas, 1992; Paas & 
Van Merriënboer, 1994; Sweller & Cooper, 1985; Van Gog, Paas, & Van Merriënboer, 2006). 
However, the effectiveness of learning from examples does seem to depend on the expertise 
of the learner: Once a learner knows how to perform the task, the examples no longer 
contribute to learning, and may even hamper it (i.e., the “expertise-reversal effect”; Kalyuga, 
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Ayres, Chandler, & Sweller, 2003). 
The Mirror Neuron System
The discovery of the mirror-neuron system is a major neuroscience finding relevant to 
observational learning. This system is thought to play an important role in the understanding 
of actions made by others, and may be responsible for our ability to learn by observing and 
imitating others. It was discovered, more or less by accident, in monkeys in the early 1990’s. 
Researchers studying cortical activation in monkeys that had to grasp objects from a box, 
noted incidentally that activation also occurred when the monkeys observed the experimenters 
grasping the objects (Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992). Much of 
the evidence for the mirror neuron system in monkeys comes from single neuron recordings. 
As this technique has (for obvious reasons) not been used in humans, there is no direct 
evidence that a mirror neuron system also exists in humans (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). 
However, numerous studies using Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation or brain imaging 
techniques have provided convincing evidence that the human motor system also has 
mirroring capacity, and is activated by observing motor actions made by others (for a review 
see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). That is, the same cortical circuits that are involved in 
executing an action oneself, also respond to observing someone else executing that action. 
Moreover, this seems to prime the execution of similar actions, which suggests that the 
mirror-neuron system mediates imitation, by priming (i.e., preparing the brain for) execution 
of the same action (Buccino et al., 2004; Craighero, Bello, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 2002; 
Iacoboni et al., 1999; Vogt, Taylor, & Hopkins, 2003). It should be noted that imitation seems 
to be a capacity of the human mirror neuron system that is absent in monkeys (Rizzolati, 
2005). A crucial difference between the mirror neuron system of monkeys and humans seems 
to be that in monkeys, the mirror neuron system is only activated by goal directed actions. 
Although many of the studies on the human mirror neuron system also involve goal directed 
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movements like observing the grasping of an object (e.g., Craighero et al., 2002) or playing a 
guitar chord (Buccino et al., 2004), there are indications that it is also activated by intransitive 
(meaningless) movements (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995). It is assumed that 
monkeys can therefore only understand the goal of an action and try to copy it, but they 
presumably cannot encode the details of the action with which the goal is achieved. Humans 
can encode how the goal is achieved, thereby enabling imitation (Rizzolatti, 2005).
In addition, the mirror neuron system seems to play a role in understanding action, 
that is, in inferring intentions of actions (Rizzolatti, 2005; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). 
Understanding action enables learning by observing not only what another individual is 
doing, but also why s/he is doing it. In the educational literature, this facet of understanding is 
assumed critical for attaining transfer, that is, application of what has been learned in new 
tasks or contexts (see e.g., Detterman & Sternberg, 1993; in the context of example-based 
learning, see Van Gog, Paas, & Van Merriënboer, 2004). Even very young children seem 
capable of understanding intentions: a study by Gergely, Bekkering, and Király (2002), 
showed that babies do not necessarily imitate an observed motor action, but interpret this 
action in terms of its context and goals, and may choose another way of achieving the same 
goal (i.e., rational imitation).
For some time, it was thought that the mirror neuron system was only activated when 
observing a real human body (part) executing an action, and not when the action was 
conducted by some other agent, such as a robot arm for example (Tai, Scherfler, Brooks, 
Sawamoto, & Castiello, 2004). However, recent evidence suggests that the goal of the 
observed action is more important for activation than the presence, for example, of a human 
vs. a robotic hand (Gazzola, Rizzolatti, Wicker, & Keysers, 2007). 
Interestingly, there are indications that the same brain areas involved in the execution 
and observation of motor actions also become active when people listen to sentences that 
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describe the performance of human actions using hands, mouths, or legs (Tettamanti et al., 
2005), or when people imagine performing an action without actual movement (Grèzes & 
Decety, 1996). Hurley (2008) proposed that the processes of motor control, mirroring, and 
mental simulation (or imagination) rely on shared neural circuits. 
Instructional Design Consequences
Motor Skills
It should be clear from the above that one of the areas where the findings regarding the 
mirror-neuron system might contribute to instructional design, is in observational learning of 
motor skills. Specifically, we propose here that the above neuroscience findings might 
partially explain an open question in the instructional design community, that is, why dynamic 
visualizations are sometimes more and sometimes less effective than static visualizations. 
Dynamic visualizations such as video or animation have become a popular means of 
providing instruction (Ayres & Paas, 2007a; Lowe & Schnotz, 2008; Mayer, 2005; Schnotz & 
Lowe, 2003). It has been suggested that dynamic visualizations should enhance learning by 
assisting students to perceive the temporal changes or movement in a system, whereas 
learning from static visualizations requires students to mentally infer these temporal changes. 
Learning by inferring temporal changes is believed to require more cognitive effort than 
perceiving temporal changes (see e.g., Hegarty, Kriz, & Cate, 2003). However, it has also 
been argued that the transient nature of dynamic visualizations challenges the assumption that 
the mental inferences of movement or change required by static visualizations are more effort 
demanding than perceiving this change as dynamic visualizations (see e.g., Ayres & Paas, 
2007b). The limitations of working memory, both regarding capacity and time (Barrouillet & 
Camos, 2007; Cowan, 2001; Miller, 1956), pose an immediate problem when dealing with 
transient information. Students have to process currently visible information, remember 
previously presented information, and relate and integrate current with previous information 
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in order to comprehend the visualization, which might cause a temporal split-attention effect 
(e.g., Ayres & Sweller, 2005). These activities can be expected to impose a high working 
memory load that may compromise comprehension because the continuing flow of 
information into a limited capacity, limited duration working memory may leave very little 
time and/or capacity to keep in mind, relate, and integrate information. Hence, information 
presented during earlier phases of a dynamic visualization may be lost before it can be 
integrated with current information. In contrast, static visuals do not pose a similar problem of 
information transience because they can be revisited on multiple occasions. Just replaying 
dynamic visualizations repeatedly also allows revisiting, but may do little to ameliorate the 
temporal split-attention problem since split-attention will occur on each iteration.
This high working memory load might therefore explain why, despite their popularity 
and the fact that dynamic visualizations seem an intuitively superior instructional format for 
representing change over time than static graphics, the superiority of dynamic over static 
visualizations has not always been demonstrated empirically. Tversky, Morrison, and 
Betrancourt (2002) explained this failure in terms of the congruency and apprehension 
principles. According to the congruency principle, dynamic visualizations may only be more 
effective than static ones when their representation of the content is congruent with the 
internal representation students need to acquire the relevant knowledge. For example, Tversky 
et al. indicated that because routes to be traversed are perceived as a series of turns, an 
effective animation should be based on turns. The apprehension principle states that dynamic 
visualizations may only be more effective when they allow for easier perception and 
understanding of the structure and content than static representations. For example, if a 
mechanical process is depicted at its natural speed, this speed may be far too low (e.g., the 
working of a pendulum clock; Fischer, Lowe, & Schwan, in press) or far too high (e.g., the 
working of a four-stroke engine; Meyer, Schnotz, & Rasch, 2008), to readily perceive the 
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relevant changes or procedures. In a recent meta-analysis, Höffler and Leutner (2007) drew 
the more positive conclusion that dynamic visualizations were more effective than static 
visualizations. In particular, the effect was greater when the animation was representational 
(as opposed to decorational), when it was highly realistic, and when procedural-motor 
knowledge was to be acquired.
We suggest that the mixed findings of research into instructional visualizations can, at 
least in part, be explained by neuroscience research on the mirror-neuron system. The bulk of 
dynamic visualizations has focused on natural processes such as how lightning develops or 
how the tides work, on technical systems such as the functioning of a bicycle pump or a 
chemical distillation process, or on abstract processes such as probability calculation (see 
Lowe & Schnotz, 2008). However, research on the mirror-neuron system suggests that 
dynamic visualizations may be most effective for learning tasks that involve human 
movement, because such visualizations automatically trigger an effortless process of 
embodied simulation by the mirror-neuron system, which primes the execution of similar 
actions. That is, due to activation of the mirror-neuron system, the information processing 
difficulties related to the transient nature of information in dynamic visualizations, may not 
occur or may be overcome. In this case, dynamic visualizations should be most effective for 
learning tasks such as surgical procedures, assembly tasks, origami, or sports, but much less 
effective for tasks that involve non-human movement such as mechanical, biological, 
chemical, or abstract processes for which they are nowadays most frequently used.
The mirror-neuron system is a system that humans (and, indeed, other primates) have 
evolved to use over many generations. It can be linked to Geary’s (2007) concept of 
evolutionary primary knowledge which is knowledge we have evolved to acquire. Such 
knowledge can be acquired easily, quickly and with relatively little effort. Our evolved ability 
to acquire knowledge of human movement may explain why we can readily obtain such 
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knowledge by observing human movement. In contrast, we may not have evolved to translate 
a series of static diagrams into human movement. That skill may constitute an example of 
evolutionary secondary knowledge that is culturally important but for which there may be no 
explicit neural structures available to facilitate the acquisition of the knowledge. Accordingly, 
dynamic may be superior to static diagrams when dealing with human movement but not 
necessarily when dealing with non-human movement.
Indeed, an advantage of dynamic over static visualizations has been shown for tasks 
involving human movement, for example in knot-tying, assembly, first-aid procedures, puzzle 
construction, or origami tasks (see e.g., Arguel & Jamet, in press; Ayres, Marcus, Chan, & 
Qian, in press; Park & Hopkins, 1993; Wetzel, Radtke, & Stern, 1994; Wong et al., in press). 
Tasks involving human movement also seem to be most completely consistent with Tversky 
et al.’s (2002) congruency and apprehension principles, which are claimed to determine the 
effectiveness of dynamic visualizations. Dynamic visualizations of human movement tasks 
are also more in line than non-human movement tasks with the learning goals and tests 
required of a learner, who often must learn to perform the observed task (i.e., imitation). In 
contrast, non-human movement tasks most often use conceptual learning and apply written 
knowledge tests. Learners are not typically requested to ‘act like a clock’ or ‘enact lightning’ 
after watching a clock or lightning animation. Thus, the congruency and apprehension 
principles may apply much more directly to human movement than non-human movement 
tasks. This difference may be important: using a motor task, Jeon and Branson (1981) showed 
that learners in a dynamic condition performed the task better after the learning phase than 
learners presented static illustrations with written or spoken text, but did not do better on a 
written test. The findings by Höffler and Leutner (2007) also show that the beneficial effect of 
dynamic over static visualizations is greater when procedural-motor knowledge has to be 
acquired.
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Even though Höffler and Leutner’s (2007) meta-analysis suggests that realism is 
important, the finding that the goal of the action seems to be most important for the activation 
of the mirror neuron system (Gazzola et al., 2007), strongly suggests that dynamic 
visualizations do not have to be restricted to videos of humans performing a task. They might 
also include computer animations in which humans are not directly depicted, as long as the 
goal-directed movement is seen as being related to human movement. For example, an option 
might be to have an animated agent (cf. robotic agent) perform the movement, or, as in the 
study by Wong et al. (in press), to show the movement without any agent explicitly depicted 
but rather, implicitly depicted by the movement of objects (Wong et al. used an origami task 
in which the paper folding movement was shown but the hands executing the movement were 
not visible). 
Cognitive Skills
The research reported above suggests that the mirror-neuron system plays a key role in 
observational learning of motor tasks. It is as yet unclear whether non-motor neurons, that is, 
neurons involved in the execution of cognitive tasks, also have mirroring capacity. A lot of 
educational research has demonstrated the effectiveness of observational learning for 
cognitive tasks (e.g., mathematics). However, it is unclear whether a mechanism similar to the 
motor mirror-neuron system is at work in observational learning of those cognitive tasks. 
There are some interesting parallels and links between findings on cognitive and motor tasks 
though, that suggest this might be an interesting issue to explore in future research.
Firstly, many complex tasks that have a motor component, also have a cognitive 
component. For example, Ayres et al. (in press) recently found that the benefits of dynamic 
visualizations over statics for the learning of motor tasks extended to both transfer 
(performing the motor task in reverse order) and related cognitive tasks (determining based on 
a screen shot what the previous or next move was).
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Secondly, the mirror-neuron system has also been proposed to play a role in social 
cognition in a more general sense, for example, in understanding social intentions (theory of 
mind; see e.g., Keysers & Gazzola, 2007). Interpreting actions of others in this manner, seems 
to go well beyond activating a similar motor program, and might therefore also play a role in 
observational learning of cognitive skills.
When it comes to purely cognitive skills (e.g., mathematics) an important difference 
between observational learning of motor skills and cognitive skills, is that cognitive “actions” 
are not readily observable. They need to be inferred from physical actions that follow from 
them, or need to be made explicit (e.g., by thinking aloud) in order to be “observed”. 
Instructional formats for observational learning of cognitive tasks often have models think 
aloud (live or video-based models) or provide a written account of cognitive actions (worked 
examples). As mentioned before, (Tettamanti et al., 2005) found that the mirror neuron 
system was also activated by listening to sentences describing motor actions. An interesting 
question is whether a similar effect of listening to action sentences might also apply to 
cognitive tasks, that is, could listening to sentences about an operation when solving a 
mathematics problem, prime the brain areas responsible for performing that operation 
oneself? 
Concerning the findings regarding understanding actions, an interesting parallel in 
observational learning of cognitive skills is that to some extent, learners also seem to be able 
to interpret the intention of cognitive actions that have been made explicit in written form (cf. 
research on self-explaining worked examples; Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989; 
Renkl, 1997). However, it has also been argued and shown that for novice learners, having the 
example or model being explicit about the rationale underlying actions can benefit learning 
(Van Gog et al., 2004, 2006, 2008). In other words, this suggests that on cognitive tasks, the 
learner needs some prior knowledge that can act as a framework for interpreting the action. 
The Mirror-Neuron System and Observational Learning   12
This need for prior knowledge also seems to apply to imagining, or mental simulation of 
cognitive tasks, which provides another interesting parallel with motor tasks. Imagining motor 
actions seems to involve some of the same brain regions as performing or observing those 
actions (see Grèzes & Decety, 2001; Hurley, 2008). Educational research has shown that 
imagining problem-solving steps to be performed can be effective for learning cognitive tasks, 
but only once the required actions form part of the learners’ repertoire (i.e., not for novices, 
but for advanced learners; Cooper, Tindall-Ford, Chandler, & Sweller, 2001; Leahy & 
Sweller, 2005, 2008). This role of prior knowledge may reflect a difference between cognitive 
and motor tasks, stemming from the difference between biologically primary (many motor 
tasks) and biologically secondary (required for most cognitive tasks) knowledge (Geary, 
2007). However, it should be kept in mind that the tasks used in neuroscience research thus 
far have been relatively simple (e.g., grasping an object), so it may also be the case that on 
more complex motor tasks, prior knowledge is also required before intentions can be inferred 
or actions can be rehearsed by imagining rather than performing them.
Discussion
There is currently an upsurge of interest in relating neuroscience research to education 
(see e.g., De Jong et al., 2008; Goswami, 2004; Katzir & Paré-Blagoev, 2006; OECD, 2007; 
Stern, Grabner, & Schumacher, 2006). However, with the exception of research on (second) 
language learning and mathematics learning and associated learning disabilities such as 
dyslexia and dyscalculia (see Katzir & Paré-Blagoev, 2006), neuroscience has not yet really 
been able to make concrete contributions to educational research, and interdisciplinary 
research is rare, although there are several other areas where joint research ventures might 
prove possible and fruitful (see De Jong et al., 2008), some of which have been discussed 
here. 
We have argued that the mirror-neuron system may provide a neuroscience base for 
The Mirror-Neuron System and Observational Learning   13
some educational procedures and hypotheses associated with the design of dynamic and static 
visualizations. The mixed findings concerning the effectiveness of instructional animations 
have been a puzzle for some time. At least a partial solution to that puzzle may be provided by 
the suggestion that the mirror neuron system assists in acquiring motor skills by observation, 
thus altering the effectiveness of dynamic compared to static visualizations. However, this 
remains an hypothesis to be tested, for which interdisciplinary research is required. Such 
research might also shed light on the relation between the mirror neuron system and working 
memory. We assume that visualizations depicting human movement may trigger an automatic 
and therefore effortless process of embodied simulation by the mirror-neuron system. From a 
cognitive load perspective, this might benefit learning by leaving more working memory 
capacity available for processes such as elaboration or reflection on intentions of actions, 
compared to static visualizations. However, we do not know whether and how the mirror 
neuron system and working memory interact at a neural level (indeed, working memory itself 
is a much debated construct in neuroscience, see e.g. Osaka, Logie, & D’Esposito, 2007).
Another question where interdisciplinary research may provide interesting findings 
concerns whether the mirror-neuron system plays a role in observational learning of cognitive 
skills. Even though there seem to be some interesting parallels between observational learning 
of motor skills and cognitive skills in the educational literature, without further research, the 
potential role of mirror neurons for cognitive skills remains speculative. 
It should be noted that we do not mean to imply here that dynamic visualizations 
should only be used for tasks involving human movement. For tasks that do not involve 
human movement, instructional interventions may improve the effectiveness of dynamic 
compared to static visualizations by reducing ineffective working memory load imposed by 
characteristics of the animations, such as transience. Such interventions could be, for 
example, self-pacing, segmenting, cueing, or changing the speed of presentation, although 
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further research is necessary to arrive at clear design guidelines (see e.g., Lowe & Schnotz, 
2007; Ayres & Paas, 2007a; Wouters, Paas, & Van Merriënboer, in press). 
We also do not mean to imply that dynamic visualizations for human movement tasks 
could not be further improved by instructional interventions. For example, findings by Arguel 
& Jamet (in press) on learning a first aid procedure show that even though dynamic 
visualizations were more effective than statics, their effectiveness could be further improved 
by adding static pictures of key actions to the dynamic visualization. In addition, when an 
expert can perform a task so rapidly that it becomes difficult for a novice to observe the 
sequence of movements, influencing the speed of the dynamic visualization may help. In sum, 
further research on how to improve the effectiveness of different kinds of dynamic 
visualizations is still required, but neuroscience findings on the mirror neuron system may 
help us understand why some dynamic visualizations have proven more effective than others. 
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Footnote
1 The terms observational learning and imitation learning are often used interchangeably, but 
they may be distinguished in that learning may occur without imitation taking place, that is, 
we may learn by observing and generating inferences beyond the observation without actually 
imitating the observed model (Bandura, 1986). Because it is broader, we will use the term 
‘observational learning’ throughout this article.
2 It is important to define expertise here. Some authors define “experts” as being individuals 
who excel in a domain (Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996), others as individuals with extensive 
experience in a domain (Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988), but in educational research it is also often 
used to refer to individuals who can perform a particular task really well (e.g., as in the 
“expertise reversal effect”; Kalyuga, Ayres, Chandler, & Sweller, 2003). This can have 
important consequences for the effectiveness of models, because domain experts differ 
enormously from students in the amount of knowledge they have, in the way this knowledge 
is organized, and the extent to which experts have automated problem-solving procedures 
(Chi et al., 1988). Therefore, having domain experts as a model might not help students, 
because the knowledge gap is too large, whereas task experts might be effective models. The 
issue can be resolved by consistently using the term “expertise” in a relative rather than 
absolute sense. In this paper, the term “expertise” should be considered in terms of “levels of 
expertise” rather than absolute expertise. One instructional technique may facilitate expertise 
more than another because it increases knowledge more irrespective of the absolute level of 
expertise, and an expert can be someone with a higher level of expertise than the learner.
